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Abstract
In many real world situations, especially involving multiagent systems and artificial intel-
ligence, participating agents often need to agree upon a common alternative even if they
have differing preferences over the available alternatives. Voting is one of the tools of choice
in these situations. Common and classic applications of voting in modern applications in-
clude collaborative filtering and recommender systems, metasearch engines, coordination
and planning among multiple automated agents etc. Agents in these applications usually
have computational power at their disposal. This makes the study of computational aspects
of voting crucial. This thesis is devoted to a study of computational complexity of several
fundamental algorithmic and complexity-theoretic problems arising in the context of voting
theory.
The typical setting for our work is an “election”; an election consists of a set of voters
or agents, a set of alternatives, and a voting rule. The vote of any agent can be thought of
as a ranking (more precisely, a complete order) of the set of alternatives. A voting profile
comprises a collection of votes of all the agents. Finally, a voting rule is a mapping that takes
as input a voting profile and outputs an alternative, which is called the “winner” or “outcome”
of the election. Our contributions in this thesis can be categorized into three parts and are
described below.
Part I: Preference Elicitation. In the first part of the thesis, we study the problem of elicit-
ing the preferences of a set of voters by asking a small number of comparison queries (such
as who a voter prefers between two given alternatives) for various interesting domains of
preferences.
We commence with considering the domain of single peaked preferences on trees in Chap-
ter 3. This domain is a significant generalization of the classical well studied domain of sin-
gle peaked preferences. The domain of single peaked preferences and its generalizations are
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hugely popular among political and social scientists. We show tight dependencies between
query complexity of preference elicitation and various parameters of the single peaked tree,
for example, number of leaves, diameter, path width, maximum degree of a node etc.
We next consider preference elicitation for the domain of single crossing preference pro-
files in Chapter 4. This domain has also been studied extensively by political scientists, social
choice theorists, and computer scientists. We establish that the query complexity of pref-
erence elicitation in this domain crucially depends on how the votes are accessed and on
whether or not any single crossing ordering is a priori known.
Part II: Winner Determination. In the second part of the thesis, we undertake a study of
the computational complexity of several important problems related to determining winner
of an election.
We begin with a study of the following problem: Given an election, predict the winner of
the election under some fixed voting rule by sampling as few votes as possible. We establish
optimal or almost optimal bounds on the number of votes that one needs to sample for many
commonly used voting rules when the margin of victory is at least εn (n is the number of
voters and ε is a parameter). We next study efficient sampling based algorithms for estimating
the margin of victory of a given election for many common voting rules. The margin of victory
of an election is a useful measure that captures the robustness of an election outcome. The
above two works are presented in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, we design an optimal algorithm for determining the plurality winner of an
election when the votes are arriving one-by-one in a streaming fashion. This resolves an
intriguing question on finding heavy hitters in a stream of items, that has remained open for
more than 35 years in the data stream literature. We also provide near optimal algorithms
for determining the winner of a stream of votes for other popular voting rules, for example,
veto, Borda, maximin etc.
Voters’ preferences are often partial orders instead of complete orders. This is known as
the incomplete information setting in computational social choice theory. In an incomplete
information setting, an extension of the winner determination problem which has been stud-
ied extensively is the problem of determining possible winners. We study the kernelization
complexity (under the complexity-theoretic framework of parameterized complexity) of the
possible winner problem in Chapter 7. We show that there do not exist kernels of size that
is polynomial in the number of alternatives for this problem for commonly used voting rules
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under a plausible complexity theoretic assumption. However, we also show that the problem
of coalitional manipulation which is an important special case of the possible winner prob-
lem admits a kernel whose size is polynomially bounded in the number of alternatives for
common voting rules.
Part III: Election Control. In the final part of the thesis, we study the computational com-
plexity of various interesting aspects of strategic behavior in voting.
First, we consider the impact of partial information in the context of strategic manipu-
lation in Chapter 8. We show that lack of complete information makes the computational
problem of manipulation intractable for many commonly used voting rules.
In Chapter 9, we initiate the study of the computational problem of detecting possible
instances of election manipulation. We show that detecting manipulation may be computa-
tionally easy under certain scenarios even when manipulation is intractable.
The computational problem of bribery is an extensively studied problem in computational
social choice theory. We study computational complexity of bribery when the briber is “fru-
gal” in nature. We show for many common voting rules that the bribery problem remains
intractable even when the briber’s behavior is restricted to be frugal, thereby strengthening
the intractability results from the literature. This forms the subject of Chapter 10.
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